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The Challenges of Security
Council Reform
Carol M. Glen
Valdosta State University
The issue of reforming the United Nations Security Council acquired new urgency in the wake of disputes over the
wa r in Iraq. The acrimony of the dispute and the ultimate
failure
of the Se cu rit y Council to reach agreement,
seriously undermined
the perceived legitimacy of the Council. However , although
the crisis brought the issue of
reform to the fore it was not the first time that such
reform had been discus se d . Almost since the founding
of
the UN, the structure of the Security Council has been a
point of contention for those who believe that they are
effectively
disenfranchised
within the system.
Together
the twin problems of Security Council effectiveness
and
equitable
representation
have come together
to strengthen the case for reform . This paper places current attempts at Security Council reform into historical
context
and assesses the challenges
that these reform proposals
face.

T

he issue of reforming the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) acquired new urgency in the wake of the bitter
disputes over the war in Iraq. During negotiations the
United States warned that the Security Council risked irrelevancy if it did not act to confront blatant violations of its own resolutions. Others implicitly contended that the Security Council
should not allow itself to be used simply as a rubber stamp for a
policy position already pre-determined by one its members. In
the eyes of many, the acrimony of the dispute and the ultimatefailure of the Security Council members to reach agreement seriously undermined the perceived legitimacy of the Council in
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particular and the United Nations more generally. In the words of
Kofi Annan (2003) "rarely have such dire forecasts been made
about the UN."
The Security Council crisis, precipitated by the Iraq war,
brought the issue of reform to the fore but it was not the first
time that such reform had been discussed. Almost since the
founding of the UN, the structure of the Security Council has
been a point of contention for those who believe that they are
effectively disenfranchised within the UN system. Countries that
do not hold a privileged position as a permanent member complain that the Security Council does not represent the general UN
membership and that its voting rights are highly skewed. The list
of criticisms aimed at the UNSC has been summarized by Luck
(2005):
It is undemocratic and unrepresentative . It is inequitable
in its composition, its decision-making rules, and its
working methods . It is largely unaccountable and unresponsive to its obligations towards other principle organs,
particularly the General Assembly and the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) . As a result, it lacks credibility and legitimacy .. ..

From this perspective, the Security Council's waning legitimacy has less to do with Iraq than it has to do with a perceived
lack of equity. The problem is rooted in process rather than policy. The underlying assumption of most, if not all reform efforts,
is that the exclusionary nature of the UNSC reduces its legitimacy and therefore undermines support for its decisions. Improve
representational equity and UNSC effectiveness wiU be enhanced. This conclusion however omits one very important factor for it ignores the realities of the UNSC power structure.
Clearly any reform, if it is to be successful, must also take into
account the interests of the five veto-wielding permanent memVO L.
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bers (PS). UN Charter amendments must be approved by the PS
and it is unrealistic to expect they would vote to undermine their
own authority.
The issues of equity, efficiency and legitimacy, and the interests of the PS are therefore central to UNSC reform and are the
focus of this paper. These issues constitute the main impediments
to successful UNSC reform and provide a useful gauge by which
to assess recent reform proposals. Whether UNSC reform will
ultimately prove to be successful remains to be seen, but it is
clear that the undertaking will not be easy. The historical record
indicates that making adjustments to UN practice have been arduous and Charter amendments have been exceedingly rare.
A BRIEF msTORY OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

The UN was born out of World War II and is a reflection of
the global power structure in place at that time. Planning for the
new world body began before the war's end in a series of meetings held among allied powers, but much of the groundwork had
already been laid by the U.S. Department of State. As early as
1940, post-war policy proposals that included the establishment
of an international organization were being promoted by the
United States. These became more concrete in 1942 when representatives of twenty-six nations signed the Declaration by the
United Nations in Washington, D.C., that pledged to fight the
Axis powers collectively, pending the establishment of a more
permanent system of general security. This was the first time that
the term "United Nations" had been used, but the structural details of the organization would be left to later negotiations. Discussions continued at conferences held in Moscow and Tehran
during 1943, Dumbarton Oaks, Washington D.C., during 1944,
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and at Yalta in 1945. The UN Charter was finalized during a twomonth conference held in San Francisco in 1945. 1
The history of the founding of the UN has continued relevance for today's discussion on Security Council reform, because
much of the criticism that is leveled at the UNSC stems from its
initial structure. Contrary to popular belief, the UN was not established on the elusive footing of idealistic hopes and dreams,
but rather on the practical and vigorous give-and-take of power
politics. Certainly, major powers sought to maintain international
peace and security, but they were only willing to do so if their
sovereign rights were protected and if they were accorded special privileges. Nor was the UN founded on democratic principles. Rather it was intended that the UN represent sovereign
states, which may or may not be democratic, not the peoples of
the world (Schlesinger 1997).
The UN structure that emerged from San Francisco contained six main organs, but only the Security Council (UNSC)
was vested with significant power. UNSC membership was neither representative of the entire body, nor democratic in its deliberations. Membership was limited to eleven countries and only
five of them had permanent seats with veto power. The permanent five members, China, France, Soviet Union, U.K. and U.S.,
assumed such privileges as a precondition for participation. As
Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations stated to critics of the veto, "You may go home from
San Francisco-if you wish-and report that you have defeated
the veto .. .But you can also say 'We tore up the Charter" (Schlesinger 2004).
That the other member states reluctantly accepted this ultimatum was based on a realistic assessment of international poli1
For a detailed account of the negotiations surrounding the drafting of the UN Charter
see Schlesinger (2004).
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tics. It was clear that if the UNSC was to achieve results then it
must have great power support. The League of Nations had been
undermined by the refusal of the United States to join. It was
also limited by a thoroughly democratic but unworkable tenet
that gave every country a veto. The lessons then were clear to
all-- the great powers had to be involved and they had to be permitted special privileges. As Evans (1993) notes,
to convince the permanent members to adhere to the
Charter and the collective security framework embodied
therein , a deliberate decision was taken to establish a collective security system that could not be applied to the
permanent members themselves .

The organization that was born in San Francisco therefore
emerged as a hybrid of two seemingly incompatible systems. On
the one hand it contained features reminiscent of the 19th century
Concert of Europe, in which great powers were accorded special
privileges and responsibilities in policing the continent. On the
other, it displayed Wilsonian characteristics that gave smaller
powers representation. Within the UNSC the 'concert' model
was manifested in the PS, while the Wilsonian model was
represented by the non-permanent seats that were to be rotated
among lesser powers (Laurenti 1997).
The UNSC structure remained unchanged for twenty years,
until 1965 when its membership was expanded from eleven to
fifteen members. The number of permanent members remained
unchanged, but non-permanent seats were increased from six to
ten. This first reform of the Security Council was precipitated by
a large influx of new member states in the immediate post-war
period, largely due to de-colonization. In the fifteen years after
its founding, the UN more than doubled in size and pressure to
recognize this new reality became the catalyst for reform. Of
particular concern was the need to recognize African and Asian
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OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

THE CHALLENGES OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

137

states that previously had no Security Council representation.
egotiations settled on regional representation for nonpermanent seats: five seats for Africa and Asia, two from Latin
America and Caribbean, two for' Western Europe and other
states, and one for Eastern Europe (Bennett and Oliver 2002).
Proposals for further Security Council reform emerged periodically throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but it was not until
the 1990s that such suggestions gained greater urgency. Calls for
reform surfaced against the backdrop of a radically changed
global political system. The end of the Cold War brought with it
new hopes that the UN in general, and the Security Council in
particular, could be revitalized. Indeed, as the Security Council
became increasingly active in the early 1990s, especially with
regards to peacekeeping, it appeared that a new era of international cooperation had dawned. Changes in the bipolar structure
of global power had a significant impact on discussions related
to UNSC reform. With the collapse of Soviet control in Eastern
Europe, why designate separate seats for Eastern and Western
Europe? Moreover, the number of UN members had greatly increased since the last Security Council reform in 1965, increasing from 117 to 192 today.2 A strong case for representation was
also made by Germany and Japan, which were now major contributors to the UN budget and important economic and political
players on the world stage. Finally, calls for UNSC reform were
reinforced in Secretary General Boutros Ghali's ambitious Agenda for Peace published in 1992. Although this report focused
primarily on ways to strengthen the UN's capacity to maintain
peace, it nevertheless provoked discussion on the broader issue
of Security Council reform.
' Nevertheless , the proportion of UNSC seats, as a percentage of total membership , has
been declining since 1945. At the UN' s founding, UNSC seats represented 21% of total
membership . After the first expansion in 1965 this figure was 13%, today it is 8%.
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Despite numerous calls for Security Council reform that
have been heard over the decades, adjustments have remained
somewhat limited. Some of the difficulties in reforming the
UNSC stem from its original structure and some are of more recent origin. In either case, the disparate goals of all of the UN
member states, large and small, powerful and weak will not be
easy to satisfy, and significant challenges remain.
Equitable Representation

Geographic representation in the UNSC is heavily tilted in
favor of the Global North. Four out of five permanent seats are
allocated to developed countries, and this imbalance becomes
more obvious when examined in terms of UN membership
growth. Most of the growth in UN membership has occurred
among African and Asian states. So that today, developing countries constitute more than two-thirds of the UN membership.
Procedures for electing nonpermanent members to the
UNSC contribute to the distortion. Elections for nonpermanent
seats are held by the General Assembly in pre-determined regional groupings. For individual countries, selection depends on
being elected by a regional group, or waiting one's tum in a rotational system. Whether a particular country gets the chance to
serve on the UNSC is therefore partially determined by the size
of the regional group in which it holds membership. Clearly, this
structural arrangement gives countries in smaller groups a higher
probability of being selected. For instance, since the last UNSC
enlargement in 1965 Italy, a member of the Western Europe and
Others Group (WEOG, with 28 members 3 ) has served five times,
3

This figure does not include Israel, which has been partially admitted to WEOG on a temporary basis beginning in May 2002 but only in connection with elections to UN bodies
Note continues
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while Nigeria, the leading participant in the Africa group (53
4
members) has served on the UNSC only twice. Advocates for
reform maintain that this system undermines the principle of sovereign equality of all member states established by the Charter
and fails to provide equality of opportunity for all countries to
serve on the main UN institutions.
Much of the acrimony surrounding the question of UNSC
reform centers on the issue of equitable geographic representation, but in terms of Charter provisions this emphasis is somewhat off track. Article 23 that governs UNSC membership refers
to equitable geographic distribution of seats not equitable representation. This is an important distinction for it is obvious that
the former can be obtained without the latter. How representative
is Saudi Arabia or Iran, for instance, of the entire continent of
Asia? Moreover, the Charter stipulation for equitable distribution
follows other provisions apparently deemed more important. The
specific Charter reference states that in selecting non-permanent
members to the UNSC, due regards should be "specially paid in
the first instance to the contributions of Members of the United
Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security
and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographic distribution" (UN Charter 1945, Article 23).
Equitable geographic distribution seems like an after thought; the
founders of the UN apparently endorsed capability over parity.
The Security Council was never designed to be the democratic
arm of the UN. Instead, that designation was granted to the Gen-

held in New York . Israel is the only UN member state that is not a full member of any
regional group .
• A full list of countries elected to the UNSC can be found at http://www .un.org .
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eral Assembly, where egalitarianism is enshrined in the principle
of one country-one vote.5
Efficiency and Legitimacy

The optimum size of any decision-making body is the size
that maximizes internal efficiency, while retaining its external
legitimacy. Too small and it may lose the support of those for
whom it operates. Too large and deadlock becomes a real possibility. Achieving a balance between these two poles is the key.
It would seem that a very limited expansion of the UNSC
would aid expeditious decision-making, particularly in times of
crisis. TI1e UNSC has primary responsibility for maintaining
global peace and security; it cannot afford to be hindered by excessive debate and speechrnaking. Moreover, a smaller Council
would make it easier to reach agreement on resolutions. Currently, nine out of fifteen votes and the concurrence of the permanent
members are required to pass a resolution. If the UNSC is increased significantly, the result could be a Council that is only
marginally more representative, but considerably more cumbersome.
On the other hand, the question of efficiency is not purely a
numbers game. Efficiency must also be viewed in terms of political influence. A larger Security Council that is at least perceived
to be more representative, and therefore more legitimate, should
find it easier to gain support for its decisions. TI1e question of
efficiency therefore cannot be separated from the issue of legitimacy. Projecting legitimate authority is vital for UNSC success
for it has no means to enforce its decisions. Once military action
is authorized, the UNSC must rely on the cooperation of member
s It should be noted however , that although the General Assembly is based on the principle of one country, one vote, its power is largely limited to making non-binding recommendations . A notable exception relates to recommendations on the UN budget.
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states to implement that mandate. As a result, a larger Council
could conceivably be more effective than a smaller one. Although it may be easier to build consensus in a smaller arena, if
that agreement excludes important dissenting voices, then it is a
false consensus that will be less likely to generate support.
For some member states legitimacy is synonymous with representation. For others it is tied to efficiency and effective response. These positions appear incongruous but are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. While it seems contrary to the
interests of existing members, especially the PS, to increase the
size of the UNSC could be advantageous if new members also
bring additional resources. The history of Security Council actions demonstrates that mandates are often delayed for lack of
resources or seriously underfunded. Expanding the UNSC to include countries that are able and willing to contribute to the
maintenance of peace and security could increase available resources and be an acceptable trade-off that would offset the inefficiencies generated by increased size.
Permanent Five Interests

The UN was founded on a compromise between the great
powers to manage and protect their interests and their special
status was embodied in the veto. Since it is inconceivable that
any PS member would voluntarily relinquish this privilege, the
national interests of the PS will continue to dominate UNSC action, or inaction, for the foreseeable future. The interests of the
permanent five are most obviously displayed in the use of the
veto. Since the founding of the UN until January 1997 the veto
has exercised 261 times. However, its use has been declining in
recent years.6
6

207 of these vetoes occurred before 1986 (http ://www.un.org) .
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In order to be implemented, a UNSC reform proposal must
receive two-thirds support from the General Assembly and the
approval of nine existing members of the Security Council, including ratification by all five permanent members. The positions that the PS countries take regarding UNSC reform is therefore of ultimate importance. Not surprisingly, none of the PS has
stated a preference for expanding veto power to additional
member states. This would simply add the potential for further
obstructionism. So with discussion of veto power effectively off
the table, the permanent five have narrowed the range of possible
options that can be considered.
Of all the PS members, none is more important to the UN
than the United States. The US was instrumental in founding the
organization and is currently the largest contributor to the UN
budget. 7 The attitude of the US government is crucial not only
for the viability of UNSC reform, but also for the success of the
UN more generally. The US emerged from the Cold War as the
unrivaled superpower. This preeminence of American military
might conditions its responses toward tl1e UN. During the early
1990s, when tl1eworld was emerging from the Cold War, George
H. W. Bush found the UN to be a useful multilateral tool with
which to pursue US interests abroad, especially regarding Iraq.
However, as US supremacy becan1e increasingly apparent
throughout the 1990s, a retreat from multilateralism also became
obvious. When George W. Bush took office in 2000, the progress
towards unilateralism accelerated, exemplified in tl1e National
Security Strategy (2003), which proclaims, "we will not hesitate
to act alone."
The implications of this shift in US policy toward unilateralism are serious for the UN. The UN cannot hope to operate for
7

Although the U.S. is subject to the highest budget assessment, its payments are currently in arrears.
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very long without US financial and military support. To a large
extent then, UNSC reform involves recognizing the interests of
the US, and keeping the US committed. o reform will occur if
it is contrary to US interests. Kofi Annan has implicitly recognized this imperative. In his "fork in the road" speech to the
General Assembly, Annan (2003) noted "it is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the concerns that make some states feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is
those concerns that drive them to take unilateral action." UN
reform, in all of its manifestations, will only succeed if it recognizes and embraces the political power realities of the early 21st
century.

SECURITY COUNCIL REF ORM PRO POSALS

Most of the reform proposals now on the table emerged after
the divisive Security Council debates over Iraq. However a major study, known as the Raza.IiPlan was published prior. The Razali plan was produced by the Open-Ended Working Group on
the Questions of Equitable Representation on an Increase in the
Me mbership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related
to the Security Council, which began deliberations in 1993 and
reported during 1997.8 The report was named after the President
of the General Assembly, Raza.IiIsmail from Malaysia. The main
recommendations of the Razali plan included the expansion of
the UNSC to twenty-four members, with new permanent and
non-permanent seats. A comparison of the Razali plan with the
current composition of the UNSC is displayed in Table 1.

• This panel was established in 1993 under General Assembly resolution 48/26.
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Table 1
Current Security Council and Razali Plan
Current
Security Council

Razali Plan

Permanent
Number

Held by

IO

5

• 5 Afiica and Asia
• 2 L. America & Carib.
• 1 E. Europe
• I W. Europe & others

• China
• France
• Russia

• UK

• us
Non-Perman ent
Number

Held by

Total

10

14

• Current , plus
• two industriali zed
countries
• one each from
Asia, L . America ,
Africa

• Current, plus
• one each from Asia,
L. America , Africa,
and Eastern Europe

24

15

The Razali plan aimed to broaden geographic representation
on the UNSC and make it more equitable. The number of permanent seats would be doubled to ten, but taking into account
the interests of the P5, Razali did not envisage veto power for the
new members. Two of the new permanent seats would be allocated to industrialized countries, which, it was widely believed
would be Japan and Germany, since these countries are second
and third largest contributors to the UN budget respectively.
Asia, Latin America, and Africa would each receive one additional permanent and one additional nonperrnanent seat, while
Eastern Europe would be allocated one more nonpermanent seat
only.
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Despite years of consultations and much negotiated compromises with representatives of 165 countries, the Razali Plan
was never put to a vote. Opposition came from several sources.
Developing countries, led by the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) argued that under the Razali plan industrialized countries
would further dominate the UNSC. Since the plan was to be introduced in stages, and only the final stage would have to be approved by a two-thirds majority, the NAM was especially
alarmed by the prospect that Japan and Germany would gain
permanent seats "through the back door" (Borantonos and Magli veras 2002, 26). They argued that such an action would violate
Article 108 of the Charter, which requires approval of two-thirds
of the General Assembly for Charter amendments. However,
some of the most vociferous opposition came from the so-called
"Coffee Club," led by Italy. The Coffee Club was a group of
middle-sized states from across all regional groupings that collectively came together to oppose any new permanent seat additions. The club was particularly concerned about the possibility
that regional rivals would gain these seats. As a result of strong
opposition, momentum for Security Council reform came to a
halt, with the exception of a commitment included in the Millennium Declaration (2000) that obliged member states to "intensify
their efforts to achieve comprehensive reform of the Security
Council in all its aspects."
The Security Council crisis precipitated by fundamental disagreements over Iraq resurrected the reform debate. Secretary
General Kofi Annan (2003) declared that the UN had reached a
"fork in the road ... no less decisive than 1945, when the United
Nations was founded." He went on to present a case for UN
reform that included appeals to make the UN more representative and relevant for 21 st century requirements. To examine
reform options, Annan appointed a sixteen member High Level
Panel of "eminent persons" in September 2003. One of the manVOL . 37 2008
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dates of the panel was to recommend changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, including a review of the principal organs of the United Nations.
The panel presented its final report, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, to the Secretary-General on December 2, 2004. Included in the report's 101 recommendations, were
two specific proposals on UNSC expansion (see Table 2).
Table 2
High Level Panel Reform Proposals

Region
Model A
Africa
Asia pacific
Europe
Americas
Totals
ModelB
Africa
Asia pacifie
Europe
Americas
Totals

Permanent
(continuing)

Proposed
New
Permanent

53
56
47
35
191

0
1
3
1
5

2
2
1
1
6

4
3
2
4
13

6
6
6
6
24

53
56
47
35
191

0
1
3
1
5

2
2
2
2
8

4
3
1
3
11

6
6
6
6
24

No. of
States

Proposed
2-year
Nonpermanent Total

The High Level Panel followed Razali in recommending an increase in UNSC seats to twenty-four, but departed from Razali's
specific recommendations regarding how they should be allocated. Model A would add six new permanent seats and three
new nonpermanent seats, while Model B would add a new
second tier of eight four-year renewable seats plus one additional
nonpermanent seat. In both cases the objective was to create a
balance among all geographic areas, with six seats being allocated to each region. These regional divisions differ from both
THE JOURNAL
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the Razali proposals and from current UNSC arrangements. For
the first time, Africa would gain an independent entitlement to
six seats-an obvious improvement over current arrangements
that allocates just five seats to be shared by a 'gentleman's
agreement' among the entire Africa-Asia region.
The High Level Panel left decisions on which countries
should be assigned the new seats to the General Assembly. However, it did recommend that preferences for the longer term seats
be given to those countries that "are among the top three financial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular
budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional
area to United Nations peacekeeping missions" (High Level
Panel, 2004, clause 254). This point was reiterated a year later by
Kofi Annan, in his report, In Larger Freedom (2005).
The panel recommended no change in the veto held by the
five permanent members. Despite recognizing that the veto is
both anachronistic and "unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly democratic age" (High Level Panel, 2004, clause
256), panel members could not envisage any practical means by
which the veto could be eliminated. They did request however
that permanent members refrain from using the veto in cases of
genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. The panel also
recommended that processes to improve transparency and accountability be incorporated and formalized in the Council's
rules of procedure (clause 258).
Although Models A and B seemed to offer something for
everyone and had the advantage of not challenging the authority
of the PS, criticism and alternative proposals emerged very
quickly after the publication of the High Level Panel's report.
During summer 2004 three additional proposals appeared that
added to the High Level Panel's recommendations (see Table 3).
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Table3
Alternative UNSC Reform Proposals
ew
Permanent Seats

Group

G4
African Union

UnitingforConsensus

ew
NonPermanent
Seats

6
6

4

0

10

5

Total

Security
Council
Seats

25
26
25

Veto
power
Extended?

Maybe

Yes
No

On July 6111, Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil (G4) submitted their proposals to the General Assembly as the culmination of
an intense, coordinated campaign to lobby for new permanent
seats. By acting together and representing several continents it
was hoped that they would increase their chances of receiving
the two-thirds support in the General Assembly that would be
requir~d. The G4 framework envisages enlargement of the
UNSC to include six new permanent seats, two each for Africa
and Asia, one for western states, and one for Latin America and
Caribbean. The proposal also included provisions for four nonpermanent seats, one each for Africa, Asia, Latin America and
the Caribbean, and for Eastern Europe. A decision on the granting of veto power would be postponed until a review conference
was held 15 years following Charter amendment.
A week after the G4 proposal was introduced, the African
Union (AU) presented a draft resolution that was similar to the
G4 proposals but with a couple of important differences. The AU
argued that veto power should either be abolished for all or extended to include incoming permanent members. If extended, the
power should be limited to only the most vital areas related to
peace and security. The African states also sought an additional
nonpermanent seat for Africa.
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A third major proposal came on July 21 st from the Uniting
for Consensus group, comprised of most of the old Coffee Club
members. 9 The latest proposal includes two alternative models
that would each add an additional ten nonpermanent seats assigned to individual states. 10 Both of these variations would retain the current regional groupings, rather than the new regional
groupings created by the High Level Panel.
Italy broke slightly · with the other Uniting for Consensus
members in suggesting that rather than seats being allocated to
individual countries, regional groups should have operational
management to prevent the national occupation of the new seats.
As the Coffee Club had argued before, all of the members of the
Uniting for Consensus group strongly oppose the addition of any
new permanent seats.
A somewhat different approach to reform was presented to
the General Assembly by Costa Rica, Jordan, Lichtenstien, Siganpore, and Switzerald (known as the S-5) during March 2006.
Rather than focusing on the contentious issue of expansion, this
group was primarily concerned with improving the working methods of the Council. They made nineteen specific recommendations that emphasized the need for greater transparency within
the UNSC as well as improved communications between the
Council and the general membership. Regarding use of the veto,
the S-5 recommended that a permanent member should explain
its veto at the time of its use. Then that explanation should be
circulated as a Security Council document to all members of the
9

The Uniting for Consensus U.S. membership is comprised of Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino,
Spain and Turkey.
0
' The two proposals are known as the Green and Blue Models. The Green Model is
similar to the High Level Panel' s Model A, but creates new regional groups. The Blue
Model is a variation of the High Level Panel's Model B, in that it creates a new category
of longer terms seats, but it also expands the number of two-year seats.
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UN. In addition, the S-5 echoed the High Level Panel by stating
that permanent members should refrain from casting a negative
vote in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious
violations of international humanitarian law (General Assembly,
2006a).
Although the S-5 report, in the words of one Japanese delegate "captured wide attention" and was viewed as a "meaningful
first step" (General Assembly, 2006b), it does little to solve the
key issues of equity and representation. Moreover, the response
of the PS was lukewarm at best. In a Note ji-om the President of
the Security Council on Improving Working Methods (Security
Council, 2006) the UNSC pledged to increase transparency and
increase consultations; however it made no mention of altering
the conditions under which the veto would be used. The S-5
were also reminded by US Ambassador John Bolton that the
"Charter gave the Council sole authority over its own working
methods" (Bolton 2006).
Constraints Imposed by Regional Rivalries

Although almost all UN members have stated that they are in
favor of some degree of Security Council reform, resistance to
the proposals thus far presented has been significant. Opposition
is clearly rooted in P5 self-interest, but it can also be found in the
form of regional political rivalries. It has been relatively easy to
reach agreement that reform is needed, especially among countries that feel disenfranchised. Yet, consensus on which countries
should benefit from reform remains elusive.
Despite having some legitimate claims the G4 countries face
considerable challenges in winning their desired permanent
seats . The case made by the Japanese and German governments
rests on the value of their financial contributions as the second
and third largest contributors to the UN budget respectively.
Both countries positions were reinforced through much of the
T H E JO URNA L OF POLI T ICAL SCIENCE

mE CHALLENGES OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

151

1990s, because they could count on the support of the Clinton
administration, but this endorsement weakened with the George
W. Bush presidency. While the US still favors a Japanese seat, it
refused to endorse a German candidacy following disagreements
over the Iraq war. The Japanese claim is still far from assured
because of opposition from China. The Chinese government has
given its tacit support to a grassroots campaign conducted on
popular Chinese web sites that seeks to block Japan's bid. More
explicitly, the Chinese government stated that reform should focus on increasing the representation of developing countries only, and called the G4's push for an early vote "dangerous and
divisive" (Kahn, 2005) .
The G4 plan is also opposed by the Uniting for Consensus
group. That group came into existence primarily as a reaction to
the G4 refonn campaign. As an indication of the acrimony of the
discussion, some members of the Uniting for Consensus group
have accused the G4 of trying to hijack the reform process for
their own benefit. Pakistan described the four countries as "seekers of special privileges and power masquerading as the champions of the weak and disadvantaged" (Akram, 2005) . At the
same time, Italy accused the G4 of using aid money to buy votes
and demanded an investigation into their "improper and unethical behavior" (Lederer, 2005). Committee sessions became so
heated that Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged nations "to calm
down" when debating enlargement of the U.N. Security (Leopold, 2005). The most serious blow to the hopes of the G4 came
in August 2005 when Washington and Beijing reached an agreement to work in "parallel" to block the G4 plan. They have not
stated whether or not they are willing to use veto power, but
clearly this is an option. Although officially, the US supports a
permanent seat on the Security Council for Japan, it rejects the
G4 plan, the only serious proposal that would make this a reality .
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The US does not want Brazil, Germany, and India to gain permanent seats.
Disagreements among regional rivals with regards to UNSC
reform also plague the African continent. The front-runners for
the permanent seats in the AU proposal are South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt, Libya and Senegal, but the AU has been unable to devise a clear plan to decide on which countries to choose.
In keeping with the High Level Panel's recommendation that
consideration should be given to countries that contribute most
to the United Nations fmancially, militarily and diplomatically,
the AU stated that it would establish criteria to ensure that the
selected countries would be representative of Africa and would
have the capacity to act. Such decisions, however, are far from
straightforward. What does it mean to be a representative of
Africa? Based on population Nigeria would be the first choice,
but Nigeria has been an unreliable financial partner. It is a chronically late contributor to the UN budget and has a large national
debt. Libya may be regarded as being more representative,
Muammar Gaddafi is widely viewed as the father of the African
Union, but this choice would likely face opposition from outside
of the AU. By contrast, another front-runner Egypt, is considered
more favorably in the Global North but been accused by some of
not being African enough (Okumu, 2005)
With the AU being unable to make a fmal decision, some
African countries have sought partnerships with member states
from other regions and on the Security Council. South Africa has
engaged in negotiations with Brazil, India, and Japan. Nigeria
has moved closer to China and Russia, while Egypt is hoping for
US support. France has backed Senegal but its candidacy will
likely face strong opposition from China since Senegal has established diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Okumu, 2005). Of
all prospective candidates, South Africa seems to be the top con-
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tender for one of the African seats but regional rival Nigeria is
still working frantically to undermine its chances.
The Uniting for Consensus group is most concerned with
blocking the addition of new permanent seats. It favors ten nonpermanent seats only. This position therefore brings them into
direct opposition with both the G4 and the AU which seek the
addition of permanent seats. The Uniting for Consensus group
has been accused of obstructionism as it has sought to block G4
attempt to bring the issue to an early vote. While the UC group
has accused the G4 of undue haste, the G4 points out that discussions on reform of the Security Council have been on going, in
earnest, for well over a decade (Oshima 2005). The G4 therefore
maintains that failure to act would not only mean that an historic
opportunity for meaningful change would be missed, it would
also undermine the legitimacy of an already discredited Security
Council. A representative of the G4 from Brazil also noted that
restricting the expansion of the Council to non-permanent members would risk increasing the disparity in the Council's composition (Sardenberg 2005).
Many of these divergent positions were clearly expressed
during the 2005 World Sununit and during consultations held in
the General Assembly plenary during July 2006. The positions
are summarized in Table 4. The data include only the positions of
those who spoke during these sessions and the co-sponsors of the
main proposals.
Table 4 confinns that there is little support for maintaining
the status quo with ninety-seven percent, including all of the P5,
in favor of expanding the number of UNSC seats. However,
tl1ere appears to be limited agreement beyond that point. Support
for the G4 and African Union proposals is fairly evenly split, but
only the G4 plan has some PS support. It is also worth noting
that whereas the G4 proposal draws support from countries
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across most of the regional groups, the African Union plan finds
support from the African group only.11
The addition of new permanent seats is also widely supported but there is disagreement over which countries should be
granted such seats. It is of particular significance that the PS differs on this issue. There is consensus among the PS however
Table 4
M ember State Po sitions on UN Reform
Percent
Favoring

Proposal

PS Support

Support at 2005 World Summit
G4

34.4

France

G4 with conditions

8.8

African Union

37.7

None

Uniting for Consensus

13.3

None

Postpone vote

5.5

China
Russia

UK

us

Support at 2006 Plenary

UNSC Expansion

97

China
France
Russia
UK

us
New Permanent seats

69

France
UK

Extend veto to new seats

13

None

us

Source: Author compiled from information from http ://www.reformtheun .org.

11

The G4 plan is supported by countries that are members of the following groups : Asia ,
Eastern Europe, Latin American and Western Europe and Others .
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with regards to the veto. No P5 member has expressed support
for extending the veto to new members or limiting its current
use .
Despite agreement on some reform proposals , none has managed to gamer unequivocal support . The need to preserve selfinterest has thus far proven stronger than the need to break with
the status quo. So what is feasible at this stage? Yet another report presented to the General Assembly during April 2007 endeavored to address this question. The report , produced by five
"facilitators" appointed by the General Assembly in February ,
was designed to elucidate "notions of the way forward" based on
a series of closed-door consultations with member states (Facilitators 2007). In their report , the facilitators recognize that since
an "ideal" solution may not be possible at this stage, a transition al approach could be used to break the deadlock. They suggest
specifically that members discuss creating an intermediary arrangement that would expand the number of nonperrnanent seats
as well as extend their time limits . The question of permanent
seats would be temporarily set aside and the new arrangement
would be subject to review at a pre-determined date. This approa ch has the advantage of avoiding the most contentious issue
concerning the allocation of permanent seats, but it contains little
that is new and is unlikely to be the catalyst for change. Despite
pleas by the facilitators for members to remain flexible on the
issue of Security Council reform , statements made in response to
their report indicate that all parties remain firmly entrenched. 12
CONCLUSION

The history of UNSC reform demonstrates that the institutional structures created by the great powers in 1945 are not easily altered . Despite being widely recognized as unrepresentative
" For a list o f statement s co nce rnin g the fac il itators re port pl ease see
http://www.reformtheun.org
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and anachronistic, there are currently few realistic possibilities
for reform. The strongest case for reform has been made on the
grounds of equity. In composition, the UN is a very different
place today than it was in 1945. Many of the more recent members continue to argue that their voices are being excluded .
Countries such as Japan and Germany make significant contributions to the UN budget. Yet, their formal political power does not
match their economic contributions.
The very broad level of support for UNSC membership expansion seems to indicate that the equity problem may be remedied by adding nonpermanent seats. This action would have the
benefit of increasing geographic representation, and perhaps legitimacy, without much cost to permanent members. Indeed, if
these countries also brought resources that they were willing to
contribute to UN operations, then the presence of additional
nonpermanent members would also add value. The unknown of
course, is whether member states that have long held out for
permanent seats would be willing to settle for less.
Successful UNSC reform must also strike a balance between
national and collective interests. Although problems and potential solutions have become increasingly global in nature , the UN
continues to operate on a Westpahlian model based on sovereignty and self-interest. In such a world , multilateral cooperation is
possible but it must be based on shared and obvious benefits.
This is especially true when it comes to gaining the support of
the PS. The United States for instance, has made it abundantly
clear that it is more concerned witl1 reforming the UN to better
deal with weapons of mass destruction and terrorism than with
the niceties of equitable representation on the Security Council.
It is therefore vital that the UN tackle such concerns earnestly,
for the United States as well as other important players have
come to view broad UN refom1 and specific Security Council
reform as a package deal.
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Finally, the failure of member states thus far to reach agreement on UNSC reform despite years of effort is not surprising in
the historical context. It is worth repeating that the UN Security
Council was never intended to be democratic or equitable. The
original structure of the UNSC was set up to protect and promote
the interests of the P5. In all likelihood this arrangement will
continue. The dispute over the Iraq war clearly demonstrated that
the UN cannot prevent a major power from acting according to
its own national interests. This is what the founders originally
intended and that reality will remain with or without reform.
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